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LAW'S QUEST FOR OBJECTIVITY
Lloyd L. Weinreb+
We are in Professor Smith's debt for a broad-ranging, richly
provocative book,' which takes a fresh approach to questions about the
nature of law and the source of its authority, questions that lie at the
heart of jurisprudence. Close attention to his description of the dilemma
of contemporary jurisprudence, "law's quandary" as he puts it, is
therapeutic. He identifies a disorder and leads us, ever so gently, to, or
at least toward, a cure. To pursue the medical metaphor one step
further, however, although he reveals symptoms that ought to concern
us, his diagnosis is, I think, mistaken and so also is his prescription. If I
may make my own diagnosis, Professor Smith perceives law as in a
quandary, because he is engaged, like those for whom he would
prescribe, in a quest for a kind of objectivity that law cannot and need
not attain. The "ontological gap",2 that he describes is of his own making.
Professor Smith asks us to consider what "the law" is or, more
precisely, whether "the law" really is at all. "[T]he most direct way to
contemplate the quandary of modern law," he says, is to ask: "Does 'the
Law' Exist?" which is the title of an important chapter of his book.' He
acknowledges that the question is "unusual," "uncouth," and "irksome.",
4
It is all of those things. It is also distinctly odd. Except under Professor
Smith's instruction, it is a question that we should never ask, because the
answer is so obvious. Of course it exists-if you want to speak in that
curious way. But just as we never ask what time is but rather what time it
is, so also we do not ask what law is or whether there is law. Rather we
ask whether an offer is effective when it is sent or when it is received,
whether the seller of a product is liable for an injury to a third party,
what the speed limit is, and so forth. Nor should anyone be disconcerted
if, like W.H. Auden,5 he is not quite prepared to answer the general
question. It will never appear on a bar exam. Formulating the issue as
Professor Smith does has a point, although the point is, perhaps, not
precisely the one that he has in mind. But in any case, we ought not to
get tied up in knots about whether law exists.
Dane Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).
2. Id. at 157.
3. Id. at 97, 41.
4. Id. at 97.
5. See W.H. AUDEN, Law Like Love, in THE COLLECTED POETRY OF W.H.
AUDEN 74 (1945).
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The focus sharpens two chapters later, when Professor Smith tells us
that he will approach the question of law's existence by asking a different
question, "How Does Law Mean?" 6 That too is an odd question, but the
reason for his asking it is clear. He wants us to consider not the meaning
of any particular law but what we have in mind when we ask for a law's
meaning. What sort of thing do we think law is, what ontological
commitments do we make, when we speak of its meaning? The meaning
of a law, he says, is semantic meaning, which is conveyed, or carried, by
words It is not the sort of meaning that has to do with the causes and
effects of physical events "in the real world," as we like to say. For
example: "If the grass is wet, that means that it rained last night." The
meaning there in question is nonsemantic; it resides not in words but in
the causal relation between rain and a wet lawn. Few of us are likely to
confuse those two kinds of meaning. Professor Smith sets them forth
because the distinction highlights what he wants to say about the law's
kind of meaning, semantic meaning.
When we confront a legal issue, Professor Smith says, we resolve it by
inquiring "what the law is." Answering that question, we come upon a
text composed of words, and we educe its semantic meaning, which tells
us what the law is or, more simply, tells us the law about that issue. But
semantic meaning (as opposed to that other kind of meaning), he says, is
a matter of intention. It is what the author of the words intends them to
communicate to the intended listener or reader. There are many reasons
why communication may fail; the author and the recipient may use a
critical word differently and so forth. But one cannot make sense of
semantic meaning without reference to an intending author. That is, in
Professor Smith's phrase, "the ontology of semantic meaning."8
There are a number of objections to this thesis, most of which
Professor Smith parries by limiting his claim to the requirement that
there be an authorial presence, without specifying any particular author.
It may be the person who first spoke or wrote the words, or a collective
author, or even a hypothetical ideal author, endowed with any human or
superhuman qualities we care to designate. Familiar questions about
authorial status and competence -whether there is such a thing as a
collective legislative intention, whether judges interpreting and applying
a statute qualify as authors, whether we should endow a hypothetical
author with qualities of an ordinary person-l'homme moyen-or an
extraordinary person- Rousseau's Legislator or Ronald Dworkin's
Hercules-are all set aside. For the point that Professor Smith wants to
6. SMITH, supra note 1, at 97. The question is the title of Chapter 5. Id. at 101.
7. Id. at 103-04.
8. Id. at 105.
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make is that none of the possible candidates has the necessary
credentials. They are all "grossly underqualified." 9 I shall not recite here
his reasons for rejecting all the candidates, which seem to me generally
persuasive. Perhaps the most telling point is his observation that a
hypothetical author, however suitably endowed, does not suffice, because
she or he is, well, hypothetical; one might as well speak of an intention at
large, which subverts the very nature of semantic meaning.' °
And so, to close the circle and complete the argument, when we speak
of what "the law" is, we are dealing with semantic meaning. Semantic
meaning presupposes an Author. But there is no Author nor, given law's
nature, could there be. When, therefore, we refer to "the law," the
words are empty; they refer to nothing. There is an "ontological gap."
The underqualification of authorial candidates is usually discussed as a
problem of legal interpretation. Professor Smith avoids that
characterization because his purpose is to explore not the interpretation
but "the law" that is interpreted. He represents interpretive issues as a
search for a hypostatized Author's communicative intention when he
wrote a defined text. But that is rarely what is at stake. The equation of
semantic meaning with an Author's intention works best in the simple
case of a conversation between two persons. In that situation, there is
little more to be said than, "What did he mean by that?"-a matter of
fact, albeit not always a simple matter of fact, even for the person whose
words they are. Professor Smith extrapolates from that case to questions
about laws of all kinds: statutes enacted in an elaborate legislative
process of hearings, committee reports, vote, and possibly veto, by a
legislative body composed of many individuals, some of whom voted for
and some against; constitutional provisions enacted for an indefinite
future by persons long since dead; and so forth. He scarcely mentions
laws that are derived from no single original text but are the product of
the continuous, conglomerate effort of lawyers, judges, and scholars, like
the common law. A great many rules of law combine elements of all
these kinds. The difficulty of identifying an author or even a text in such
circumstances is, indeed, what leads him to conclude that the ontological
status of "the law" is so shaky. Before we accept that conclusion, we
ought to ask whether there is not an entirely intelligible sense of
semantic meaning that is not tied to authorial intention in a literal sense,
as it is in Professor Smith's model, to which we refer when we speak of
"the law" and which sustains law as we know it.
9. Id. at 153; see also id. at 126-53.
10. Id. at 143-44. Reference to a hypothetical author "does not solicit the guidance
of any act of mind directed to the real controversies or questions of policy we are seeking
to address." Id. at 148-49.
2006]
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In the first place, we ought not to be misled by grammatical or
syntactical form. Such form may have profound epistemological
significance or be no more than a linguistic quirk. Either way, it is an
unreliable ontological guide. To put the matter overly simply, grammar
and syntax have to do with words, and ontology has to do with what
there is. The fact that we refer to "the law" nominatively need not entail,
as Professor Smith suggests, that there is in our "ontological
inventor[y]"" an entity that corresponds to it, any more than a reference
to "the university" means that there is something distinct from the
students, faculty, campus, and so forth, or a reference to courage means
that there is something distinct from instances of individual courage, or,
closer to our present concern, a reference to the decision of a case means
that there is something distinct from the results that follow from it.
Eschewing any view about the doctrine of Platonic Forms in general,
Professor Smith sensibly rejects the application of what he calls "'ad hoc
Platonism"' to law: the notion that the law is some sort of entity that can
be conjured up as a referent whenever we use the words "the law."' 2 But
he does just that, when he refers to law, or the law, in general.
For all that he dismisses the notion of law as a "brooding
omnipresence in the sky,' 3 Holmes's wonderful phrase, Professor Smith
reifies the law in just that way. The question "how a law means" is, he
says "familiar territory' ' 4 or, at any rate, more familiar territory than the
question whether a law exists. Not all that familiar, however, for, as he
allows, the usual question is about a particular law. And, in fact, the
question usually is not framed as a question about the law's meaning but,
more simply, as a question about what the law is: that is to say, the
content of the particular law in question. Professor Smith's
reformulation of the question as one about the law's meaning too easily
suggests that the law and its meaning are two different things, which
leads directly to his conclusion that the author of the law, whoever that
may be, is uniquely qualified to specify its meaning. But that, as
reflected in ordinary usage, is not so. What he refers to as the meaning
of a law is, in ordinary usage, the law itself.
11. Id. at 8.
12. Id. at 165.
13. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Professor
Smith dismisses Holmes's statement that the law consists of "[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious," Oliver Wendell Holmes, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 461 (1897), as "grossly deficient"; it "leaves out," he says, "nearly everything
that lawyers . . .do and say," SMITH, supra note 1, at 68. Holmes's point, surely, was
simply to reject the reification of the phrase "the law" as some sort of entity ("brooding
omnipresence"), not to give a general account of what law is.
14. SMITH, supra note 1, at 97.
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Thus, in this roundabout way, Professor Smith asks us to consider
whether there is not something inadequate or awry about the manner in
which we arrive at conclusions of law and, therefore, the conclusions at
which we arrive, which so profoundly affect people's lives. How, he asks,
can we possibly know what the law is-not this time an abstraction in
quotation marks, but the particular laws that are discussed and applied?
The uncomplicated, sensible answer is that we ascertain what the law is
by doing all the things that lawyers and judges do: parsing a statute,
reading judicial opinions, perhaps studying a treatise. Having done all
that conscientiously, we are in a position to say what the law is. Why is
that not enough?
It is not enough for Professor Smith, I think, because conscientious
lawyers and judges do all those things and reach contrary conclusions.
Although we sometimes are able to pronounce decisively that one
conclusion is better than another, often we are constrained to
acknowledge that different conclusions are alike reasonable, and we,
perforce, choose without being certain which is correct. Indeed, even
when we are not in doubt about which conclusion is to be preferred, our
certainty lacks a secure foundation. Validated by nothing more than
contested human judgment, in the last analysis, the law that shapes our
lives is a matter of will alone-the power to enforce-and not reason.
Our claim to live under a rule of law, not of men, is illusory.
The gap that Professor Smith perceives is not ontological-the
universe is not missing some furniture that ought to be there-but
normative. It is a gap between the law's normative demands and its
perceived lack of rational force. If much of our lives are lived in such a
state, it is not enough for the law, which, claiming allegiance and
demanding compliance, must be not merely reasonable but determined
certainly and absolutely by reason. And so, Professor Smith concludes:
"[W]e would perhaps be wise to confess our confusion and to
acknowledge that there are richer realities and greater powers in the
universe than our meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.' ' 15 In
this, the concluding three lines of the book, the import of the ontological
cast of his argument is revealed. His criticism of theories of legal
meaning and interpretation is not merely a call for a better interpretive
theory; it is intended to display the fundamental inadequacy of law
grounded in fallible human reason alone, and to take us to the brink of a
philosophy whereby law transcends the limits of human reason and
attains, as he says, the objectivity of a richer reality and greater power
than our own. So understood, as an effort to clear the way for
15. Id. at 179.
2006]
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recognition of an other-than-human, transcendent source of law,
Professor Smith's book is a prolegomenon to a philosophy of natural law.
As the debate between natural law and legal positivism unfolded in the
twentieth century, the search for objectivity had special urgency, as an
anguished reaction to the phenomenon of Nazism. Law, it was thought,
can, because it must, be grounded in something more secure than the law
of the state, so-called positive law. The events of the war having now
receded, the debate has lost its intensity. In this country, the search for
objectivity is now more narrowly focused on the foundations of
constitutionalism: whether constitutional law has a solid, unchanging
base in the Constitution's text and the intentions of those who drafted it
or is an evolving definition of our nationhood, to be read and reread in
the context of the nation's life. I shall not here rehearse the substantial
arguments that have been made on both sides of each of those debates16
Rather, I want to suggest that whatever form it takes, however it is
expressed, the search for objectivity of a kind that overcomes the
fallibility and uncertainty of human reason is misguided; far from
confirming the rule of law, as is supposed, the search for objectivity
undermines it and frustrates the goal that inspires the search.
Law has many dimensions. It affects our lives in many and various
ways. But in the end, its operation, directly or indirectly, contemplates
the application of a general rule, what we call "the law," to the particular
facts of a concrete case. Without that connection between a rule and the
circumstances in which it is applied, the law remains an abstract flight of
reason that, however elegant in design, leaves us untouched. For that
reason, the avenues to certain truth that are within the capacity of human
reason are unavailing. Rules may be related to other rules in the manner
of deductive inference, the truth of the premises guaranteeing the truth
of the conclusion. An inductive argument is not formally bound in the
same way, but the accumulation of observed facts may point to some
further fact or to a generalization that further experimentation validates
or not. The accuracy of the application of a rule to a fact or to any set of
facts, however complex, cannot be established in either of those ways.
Rules, like the words that compose them, do not map onto the things of
the world-objects, persons, events, circumstances-by a one-to-one
correspondence. There is no guarantee in logic or in experience or
experiment of the correspondence between a word or a concept and the
actual phenomena to which it applies that does not call for human
judgment. 7
16. For a summary, see LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 97-126
(1987).
17. See W. V. QUINE, Natural Kinds, in ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER
ESSAYS 114 (1969), reprinted in NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY 57 (Hilary Kornblith
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That is not to say that there is no way to tell "a hawk from a
handsaw.'8 Something that looks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and
waddles like a duck is a duck, not a rabbit. The ability to recognize
similarities among distinct things and, disregarding all the dissimilarities,
to identify them as the same sort of thing-ducks and not rabbits-is at
the heart of all thought, for without it we should not be able to refer to
anything at all except demonstratively ("This, not that!"). How we are
able to do that is a deep philosophical problem with a long lineage;
whether the problem is epistemological or ontological is itself unclear.
(It is, incidentally, the problem for which Plato's e £ &oq" or z (a'c-Form
or Idea-offers a solution.) But that we are able to do it is not in
question. It arises in human beings very early and is present to some
degree in most animals. 9 In law, as pervasively in ordinary life, that
ability enables us to engage in analogical reasoning, or reasoning by
example: solving a problem by noticing a resemblance to a similar
problem for which the solution is known.
It is a commonplace that analogical reasoning is used constantly in
legal reasoning, so much so that it is regarded as its hallmark. The use is
frequently criticized or deprecated, nonetheless, because analogical
reasoning lacks the credentials of deductive or inductive reasoning.' °
That is a great mistake, prompted, I believe, by the same yearning for
certainty that motivates Professor Smith. Careful analogical reasoning,
albeit not certain, is as reliable in law as it is in the ordinary affairs of life.
But more important, it is unavoidable. There is a gap between facts and
rule(s) that no rule, by itself or with others, can bridge, for a rule is
general and the set of facts is particular. Even when the application of
the rule seems beyond question-a case, as we say, "on all fours" with
another-the gap is not fully closed, as the Court's ability to overrule a
prior case by limiting it "to its own facts" makes clear.2' I have discussed
the use of analogical reasoning in the law at length in another place and
shall not extend the discussion here. 2' The points that I want to make
are: that analogical reasoning is essential for the application of a rule to a
particular instance covered by the rule, and is, therefore, an essential
ed., 2d ed. 1994). For a discussion of the application of rules to facts, in the context of
adjudication, see LLOYD L. WEINREB, LEGAL REASON 82-92 (2005).
18. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2.
19. See WEINREB, supra note 17, at 124-32.
20. E.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 3 & n.5
(1949); RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 519 (1995); Larry Alexander, Bad
Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 86 (1996); Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 371 (1997).
21. E.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion) (limiting the
holding in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)).
22. WEINREB, supra note 17, at 65-122.
2006]
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component of legal reasoning; that analogical reasoning is not unusual
but altogether ordinary in life and in law; and that although there are
well understood criteria for successful analogical reasoning, it lacks the
certainty that may attach to deductive or inductive reasoning.
It may seem a large jump from analysis of a judicial opinion to the
eternal verities and broad principles of natural law; but for purposes of
the present discussion, the connection is clear. Natural law is a broad-
ranging philosophy that embraces a great deal more than jurisprudence.
Although its statement by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century is
now regarded as classic, the doctrine that he expounded had roots in
quite different philosophic debates that took place in Athens more than a
thousand years earlier, debates that were not significantly about
jurisprudence at all; they were about the nature of reality and
humankind's place in it." Natural law transformed itself again later and
became the underpinning for the political philosophy of natural rights.
There is much within all of those developments with which one may
agree, without accepting the whole. And, indeed, in all those
transformations, natural law seems to me to speak a deep truth about the
human condition, which has profound implications for the law, as it does
for all human activities. Set against that large panorama, the particular
jurisprudence of natural law seems to me a narrow, lesser thing. It is far
from obvious to me what natural law as a distinctly jurisprudential matter
is all about. But for the reference to law, occasioned by Cicero's lax
Latin rendering of Greek thought, we might better have done without
the phrase]5 If natural law has any distinct jurisprudential meaning, it is
that there is a true or correct law that can, at least sometimes, be known
certainly. To use Ronald Dworkin's catchword, there is a "right answer"
to a legal question.26 Natural law, then, proffers a way out of Professor
Smith's quandary, as he strongly intimates. But the supposition that
there is a right answer that can be known with certainty contradicts the
rule of law itself.
The most penetrating and influential discussion of the jurisprudence of
natural law in the past several decades is that of John Finnis, in his book
Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), which may serve as an example.
Professor Finnis asserts that there are seven basic "forms of human
good" that are "obvious ('self-evident') and even unquestionable"; 27
23. See WEINREB, supra note 16, at 15-66.
24. Id. at 67-96.
25. See id. at 39-41.
26. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1978),
reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119-45 (1985).
27. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 59 (1980).
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knowledge is one, as are life, play, sociability, and some others." There
are also nine basic requirements of practical reasonableness, which are
"fundamental, underived, [and] irreducible," among which are "a
coherent plan of life," "no arbitrary preferences amongst values" or
"amongst persons," "detachment and commitment," and others. 9
Professor Finnis's discussion of those catalogues is subtle, powerful, and,
if not incontrovertible, persuasive. He provides a prescription for a good
life, with the general outline of which, at least, one is not likely to
disagree. He goes on, however, and crosses from moral reasoning to
jurisprudence. He asserts that his catalogues of basic goods and rules of
practical reasonableness together provide the basic principles of any legal
system that is conformable to reason.3" I have argued elsewhere (and
have been taken to task for arguing) that to sustain the jurisprudential
claim, Finnis must show that in at least a considerable number of cases
his catalogues determine what the law is-or ought to be-with the same
certainty that he attributes to the catalogues themselves.3' And this they
do not do. He asserts that they determine "[t]he central principle of the
law of murder, of theft, of marriage, of contract" and so forth.32 It seems
to me little more than whistling in the dark to assert that there are such
central principles and that they are known certainly. To mention only
one example, it may have seemed in 1980, when Natural Law and
Natural Rights was published, that the central principle of the law of
28. Id. at 86-90. Finnis surrounds his discussion of basic goods with disclaimers and
qualifications. Even so, it is far from clear what he has in mind. The following seems
close: to say that something is a basic good "is simply to say that reference to the pursuit of
fit] . . . makes intelligible . . . any particular instance of the human activity and
commitment involved in such pursuit." Id. at 62. As the multitude of disclaimers and
qualifications indicates, nothing more definite and concrete is plausibly a basic good.
Finnis specifically disclaims characterizing the basic goods as good in any other sense; he
says that to think of a basic good "as a value is not, as such, to think of it as a 'moral'
value." Id. If, then, the basic goods are self-evidently things to be pursued, that seems to
reflect only the nature of humankind as a striving, self-preserving, self-satisfying creature
rather than intelligible value. Finnis's ambiguous use of words like "good" and "value"
repeatedly suggests that they are more than that, his disclaimer notwithstanding. And,
indeed, unless they are more, it is difficult to understand how, together with the "basic
requirements of practical reasonableness" they add up, as he says, to "morality." Id. at
126-27 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 102, 103-26.
30. Id. at 289. Finnis is emphatic that the derivation of positive laws from basic
principles is a complex process that is not fully determined by the principles themselves.
See id. at 281-90.
31. Id. at 113-15; see also Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Moral Point of View, in NATURAL
LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY 195, 198-99 (Robert P. George ed., 1996), a rebuttal
to which is found in Robert P. George, Natural Law and Human Nature, in NATURAL
LAW THEORY 31, 36 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).
32. FINNIS, supra note 27, at 289.
2006]
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marriage was certain. Can that possibly be said in 2005, in the midst of a
national debate about precisely that question? Finnis is certain what the
central principle of marriage is, and he asserts that anyone who disagrees
is simply mistaken." He is entitled to his opinion; but it is only that.
Even if one were to agree that there are such certain central principles,
however, and to agree also about their content, they do not begin to
determine the multitude of legal issues that ordinarily concern us. Nor
could they. For especially if it is a matter of principles so broadly and
openly stated as those he has in mind, it is only by the use of humanly
fallible (analogical) reasoning that the principles can be applied. That is
not to say that the catalogues are therefore without merit, but that they
do not achieve distinctly jurisprudential significance.
Over a period of years, in a large body of writing, Ronald Dworkin has
developed a theory of law that has been described as within the general
ambit of natural law. Although the theory has affinities with natural law
and Dworkin himself, at least sometimes, has not resisted that
• • 34
designation, it scarcely resembles the classic theory. He does not rely at
all on metaphysical foundations of the kind that Professor Smith
commends. Nor does he argue, as Finnis does, that the central principles
of the law are straightforward derivations of self-evident truths about the
human condition. On the contrary, his conception of law, or "the law," is
built not from the top down but from the bottom up.
Dworkin starts from the core idea of adjudication, by which a rule of
law is applied to the circumstances of a concrete case. A judge's
commitment, he says, is not to find any answer, one among a number
that might be available, but to find an answer that she believes is right.
The very nature of adjudication, therefore, commits a judge (as well as
other participants in the adjudicative enterprise and anyone who accepts
33it on those terms) to the view that there is, indeed, a right answer.
Dworkin does not thereby refute the palpable fact that conscientious
lawyers and judges frequently disagree about what the right answer is. 36
Nor does he offer a method to determine certainly what it is or how to
tell certainly when one has found it.
The more substantial part of Dworkin's theory is what he calls "law as
integrity," which is an account of how a conscientious judge is to go
33. See id. at 127.
34. See Ronald A. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165, 165
(1982).
35. Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975), reprinted in
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1977); Dworkin, supra note 26.
36. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977).
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about finding the right answer.37 Like Professor Smith, Dworkin believes
that the task is an exercise in interpretation-and is not at all
ontologically stressed, as Professor Smith is, by referring to what is
interpreted as "the law." Law, he says, is "an interpretive concept."38
"Law as integrity" calls for a judge deciding a case to reach the result
that makes the law "the best it can be."39 He must respect the past by
taking account of the law's "text"-statutes, judicial opinions, scholarly
treatises-and look to the future by taking account of the effects of one
decision or another. He acknowledges that the task is Herculean and
does not suppose that a real judge will have the capacity, time, or
inclination to carry it out fully.40 Decisions will not always be up to the
mark. But that is the task.
Making the law the best it can be means that a decision must fit within
a seamless body of rules and principles coherently ordered vertically and
horizontally; it must be "consistent with principles taken to provide the
justification of higher levels" and "must also be consistent with the
justification offered for other decisions at that level., 4' Furthermore, this
"justificatory ascent,, 42 as he has called it, embraces at the top general
principles of political morality.43 Nothing less fully satisfies what is meant
by interpretation. Professor Smith and others have derided the
suggestion that a judge does or ought to undertake so Herculean a task in
even a single case, much less every case.44 Dworkin does not say
otherwise. But, he says, that is what interpretation means.
Although this assertion is much contested, in fact, what else could
interpretation mean? Reduced to a few words, "law as integrity,"
making the law "the best it can be," means being true to the text. What
would be the point of attending to the text all the while and then, arriving
at some intellectual crossroad with no clearly marked road signs, tossing
the text out the window and flipping a coin? Dworkin develops that
quite simple notion in a richly detailed account of how it applies to a
continuous, continuously evolving "text" composed of statutes, judicial
decisions, treatises, and the rest, prepared by a multitude of persons
known and unknown, working together and separately over hundreds of
37. RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 94 (9th reprint 1995) (1986). The fully
developed argument is set forth id. at 87-275.
38. Id. at 87.
39. Id. at 77.
40. Id. at 265.
41. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 117.
42. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 357.
43. In a democratic society, in which judges have a limited role, respect for and
consideration of the views of others would presumably be among the principles of political
morality given the greatest weight.
44. SMITH, supra note 1, at 83-85, 133.
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years. I believe that his account is largely correct and that it resolves
many conundrums and disposes of a great deal of confusion. In
particular, it allows us to speak of "the law" without falling into an
"ontological gap" or conjuring the phantasm of an impossible Author.
At two critical points, however, at the bottom and at the top of the
justificatory pyramid, the determinateness of the hierarchical structure
that Dworkin envisions and that distinguishes his theory from less fully
elaborated interpretive theories of legal positivism fails. First, at the
bottom. The glue that holds the pyramidal structure together is
deductive reasoning-the requirement of consistency among rules and
principles. At the point where a rule of law is to be applied to the facts
of a case, deductive reasoning is inoperative, for the question is not one
of consistency among rules but of determining which among the myriad
factual similarities and dissimilarities to other cases count, so as to bring
the facts within one rule or another. The judge must implicitly or
explicitly rely on analogical reasoning, as to which, not to coin a phrase,
there is "no right answer," although there may be grounds for preferring
one analogy to another.
Second, at the top. Making the law "the best it can be" is crucially
ambiguous. Is the criterion to be found in the law itself or is it some
external standard? Interpreting a statute the apparent purpose of which
is invidiously to discriminate against a group of persons, ought a judge,
looking to the law itself, interpret the law to fulfill that purpose or,
looking to a standard external to the law, to subvert it? Such questions
arise not only with respect to the gross excesses of the Nazi regime but
also with respect to small matters about which a law may be thought
unjust and wrong. Is the best interpretation of such a law one that works
toward a more pure and consistent expression of the original iniquity, or
is it one that confines it as narrowly as possible?
Dworkin does not say clearly. But his answer presumably is found in
the requirement that the particular issue be set within the whole body of
the law, including, as I have said, at the highest and most abstract level
principles of political morality.45 The task is not to make the particular
rule that decides the case as good as it can be, but in each instance to
46
make the whole body of the law as good as it can be. Since coherence is
45. "According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or
follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the
best constructive interpretation of the community's legal practice." DWORKIN, supra note
37, at 225. Dworkin has sometimes emphasized democratic values as contained in correct
principles of political morality. See Ronald Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Oct. 20, 2005, at 14 [hereinafter Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial]; cf DWORKIN,
supra note 37, at 398-99.
46. DWORKIN, supra note 37, at vii, 400.
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itself an important criterion and a broader principle subsumes one that is
narrower, the principles of political morality pull a particular law in their
direction. Unlike the right answer thesis, "law as integrity" implicates
substantive principles.
But that only removes the problem of interpretation to a higher level.
Which substantive principles? Principles having to do with justice,
fairness, and procedural regularity, 47 Dworkin tells us, and we may all
agree. But what is their content? Such principles are deeply
controversial. Is there any room for differential treatment of persons
according to group affiliations that are not voluntarily chosen? Does
political morality prefer equality of opportunity or equality of result?
Does it protect the liberty to go as far as one can with what one has, or
does it constrain what one has in order to increase the liberty of those
who have less? More concretely, does political morality protect a
woman's liberty to use her body as she wishes or does it preserve the life
of an unwanted fetus? Does it validate prevailing heterosexual practices
exclusively or does it validate individual sexual liberty and responsibility?
Dworkin has spoken out forcefully on many issues of this kind.48 But
whether at the level of concrete issues or general principles, there is no
way for us to tell whether his answers are the right answers. One can
only agree or disagree, and many disagree.
Dworkin evidently believes, as Lon Fuller did, "that coherence and
goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil., 49 That may be so.
But unless we can discern the affinity, even if one were to complete the
justificatory ascent that law as integrity requires, there would be no
assurance that one had found the right answer. Proceeding from the
bottom up, Dworkin comes out in the same place as Finnis, proceeding
from the top down (although it is noteworthy that on concrete issues,
their answers are generally not the same). Like Finnis, he makes a
convincing case for the relevance of moral considerations in the
elaboration of the law. Beyond that, although he does not quite say so,
47. See supra note 45.
48. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION (1993) (abortion, euthanasia);
DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 240-58 (criminalization of homosexual practices).
49. Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958). Dworkin sometimes suggests that the concept of law as
providing "a justification for the use of collective power against individual citizens or
groups," DWORKIN, supra note 37, at 109, determines the content of the principles of
political morality at the apex of a legal order, see, e.g., id. at 109, 190. In view of the ways
in which the state's collective power has historically been used, in the name of some
asserted good, one has to view such a suggestion with profound skepticism. Elsewhere he
intimates that a commitment to democratic values determines their content. See, e.g.,
Dworkin, Judge Roberts on Trial, supra note 45, at 14.
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at the end of the day, Dworkin's thesis depends as much on self-
evidence, that is to say personal conviction, as Finnis's.
Since its emergence in the postwar years, the search for objectivity in
the guise of natural law-what Professor Smith calls the "classical
account" 5 -has been confined largely to jurisprudential circles heavily
influenced by Catholic thought. In its stead, there has developed a rich
dialogue about constitutional interpretation, in which a place akin to that
of natural law in the larger jurisprudential debate is occupied by those
who assert that the answer to constitutional questions is to be found in
the plain meaning of the relevant constitutional text and, more
particularly, that nothing that is not found there can be regarded as
constitutional law. It will perhaps seem odd to associate natural law with
a point of view so heavily dependent on a text that is itself the product of
human contention and compromise.5 The common thread is the effort
to ground the law in an authoritative source from which concrete rules
are derived certainly and other rules, equally certainly, are excluded.
That the plain meaning of a law's text is to be applied, one might
suppose, is a proposition with which no one would quarrel. As it turns
out, however, the plain-meaning school of constitutional interpretation
gives that phrase a very particular and far more controversial meaning.
In their view, a text's plain meaning stays very close to the words of the
text, so that what is not expressly stated is excluded from its meaning."
50. SMITH, supra note 1, at 45; see also id. at 45-48, 151-53.
51. It should be noted that those who rely on plain meaning to resolve constitutional
questions may find themselves obliged to uphold an interpretation of the Constitution at
odds with what they believe on other (perhaps natural law) grounds to be correct. They
might, for example, conclude that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII, does not forbid capital punishment and at the same time believe that capital
punishment is a violation of a human (or "natural") right.
52. Justice Scalia, who calls himself a "textualist," subscribes to this view. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-24 (1997).
To be a textualist in good standing, one need not be too dull to perceive the
broader social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to serve;
or too hidebound to realize that new times require new laws. One need only
hold the belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or
write those new laws.
Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a
degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I
am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be-though better that, I
suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should not be construed strictly, and it
should not be construed leniently; it should be constructed reasonably, to contain
all that it fairly means....
But while the good textualist is not a literalist, neither is he a nihilist. Words do
have a limited range of meaning, and no interpretation that goes beyond that range
is permissible.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The sting is in the tail.
[Vol. 55:711
Law's Quest for Objectivity
In this way, with a minimal amount of slack, the text supplies an
objective reference that certifies an interpretation as correct-or not-
and thereby provides a barrier against "the ingenuity of language-
stretching judges.""
So, in Katz v. United States, rejecting the application of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches to electronic
eavesdropping, Justice Black wrote: "I do not believe that the words of
the Amendment will bear the meaning given them by today's decision
. .. A conversation overheard by eavesdropping, whether by plain
snooping or wiretapping, is not tangible and, under the normally
accepted meanings of the words, can neither be searched nor seized." 54
Similarly, in Minnesota v. Carter, concluding that the Fourth Amendment
gives no protection to a person in another person's home, Justice Scalia
has written that because the text protects "'[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects"' and the reference to
"their persons" must refer to each person individually, so also must the
reference to "houses" refer to the house of each.55 It is not, he has said,
"linguistically possible" to read the Amendment differently. 
56
Interpretive questions arise concretely from the need to apply a
constitutional text to a particular set of facts: to the FBI's eavesdropping
on Katz's telephone conversations from a public telephone booth in the
former case and to a police officer's observation of Carter in another
person's apartment in the latter.57 As I have said, the application of
words to concrete particulars, events in these cases, is not susceptible to
deductive proof or inductive verification; it is, rather, a matter of
perceiving resemblance and difference and distinguishing the relevant
from the irrelevant. When the text is found in the Constitution, the
matter is greatly complicated. For the meaning that is sought is (as
Professor Smith tells us) semantic meaning, which depends on authorial
intention-what is intended by the text to be communicated by a
suppositious writer to a suppositious reader. Authorial intention
53. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (Black, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 364-65.
55. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations in
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV).
56. Id. There is a suggestion in the Katz opinion that by entering a telephone booth
and depositing a coin, one rents the booth and makes it temporarily his dwelling. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. Is that a permissible interpretation of the textual reference to
"houses" and a like interpretation with respect to a friend's house not? Justice Scalia's
reading of the Fourth Amendment commits him either to the view that the decision in
Katz (and a legion of subsequent cases) was wrong or that the Fourth Amendment confers
greater privacy when one is in a public telephone booth than when he is in a friend's
home.
57. Carter, 525 U.S. at 85; Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
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implicates the reader as much as the writer, for the writer's intention is to
communicate to someone who is not an abstract figure but, like the
author himself, has identifiable characteristics appropriate to a time and
place. So, in 1787, it was possible to refer to "We the People of the
United States" without including about eighteen percent of the non-
native population, whose ancestors had come to this continent as long
ago as anyone." No one could say that the meaning of those words today
is the same. That is not an application of Humpty-Dumpty's famous
dictum.59  It is, rather, part of the complex nature of language.
Ordinarily, we do not need to choose between writer and reader, for they
are in a general way part of the same community. When we interpret the
Constitution, however, we do, because writer and reader are separated
by more than 200 years, during which there have occurred vast
technological, social, economic, and political changes.
Simply as a matter of what "meaning" means in such circumstances, it
is not at all obvious, as both Justices Black and Scalia assume it is, that
the plain meaning of the text is what an author 200-plus years ago would
have intended to communicate to a reader 200-plus years ago. Especially
is that not obvious if the author is presumed to be aware that he is
writing a Constitution, for readers who will come along in the indefinite
future. It seems to me a most dubious assertion that, knowing nothing
whatever about electronic eavesdropping, the authors of the Fourth
Amendment intended not to include it within the applications of the
word "search," or that having no thought about a professional police
force or the social conventions of modern life, they intended that the
privacy of one's person not include protection against being secretly
observed by the police when one is in another person's home. But even
if one were prepared to make that leap in the dark, it is far from clear
that that is the plain meaning of the text today.
To say otherwise is not to alter the text, but to apply it. That is to say,
I believe that Justice Black and Justice Scalia, having to apply the Fourth
Amendment to the facts of the case, did exactly what they ought to have
done. They sought the meaning of the text. But they got it wrong. So to
open up the inquiry into meaning is to abandon certainty. The
constitutional issues that have engendered the greatest controversy affect
58. The total non-native population of the United States in 1790 was 3,929,000, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2004-2005, at 16 (124th ed. 2004), of whom 697,624 were slaves, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NEGRO POPULATION: 1790-1915, at 57 (1918).
59. "'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, ... 'it means just what I choose it to
mean-neither more nor less .... The question is . . . which is to be master-that's all."'
LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 94 (spec. ed., Random House 1946)
(1871).
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matters of the deepest concern for a great many people. It is
unsurprising that they, as well as the rest of us including the judges
themselves, want the answers that the courts give to be right-certainly
right. Sometimes, indeed, it is difficult to avoid the conviction that
certainty about what the right answer is dictates how the text is
interpreted, so that certainty is assured. But one need not suppose that.
We may, and often do, have a reasonable certitude about what the right
answer is. Beyond that, objectivity, not in the sense of correspondence
with some reality that is out there or comprehensive self-validating
coherence, but in the sense of demonstrable certainty, is not to be had.
Justice Black, who was unable to find an application to electronic
eavesdropping in the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures was the author of the Supreme
Court's opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders,6° one of the legislative
apportionment cases that the Court decided in 1964. He wrote that the
provision in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution that members of the
House of Representatives shall be chosen "'by the People of the several
States"' means that the principle of "one person, one vote" is
constitutionally required." As a statement of the plain meaning of the
phrase "by the People" at the time the Constitution was adopted, that
proposition is preposterous. I was law clerk to Justice Harlan that year.
He set me to work studying the history of that provision and others on
62
which the majority relied in other legislative apportionment cases.
There was a good deal of history in addition to the apparent meaning of
the text that contradicted the majority's decision. In the way of someone
who has worked hard to support a particular result, in the way of law
clerks in particular, I was fully convinced by Justice Harlan's dissent. I
asked myself and asked Justice Harlan whether there was any form of
words that could have been employed in the Constitution that would
have prevented the majority from deciding as it did, and I concluded that
on the face of things, there was not. At the time, that seemed to me a
knock-down, drag-out argument that the majority was mistaken. Else,
what, finally, was the value of the Constitution? I now believe that,
indeed, there may have been no such form of words and that,
nevertheless, the majority was correct.
60. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
61. Id. at 7-8 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
62. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Md. Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); Davis v. Mann,
377 U.S. 678 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 (1964); Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen.
Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Wesberry v.
Sanders is at 376 U.S. 1, 20. He wrote a single dissenting opinion applicable to all the
other cases. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 589.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
And so we are brought back to Professor Smith's challenging
conclusion that it would be well for us "to confess our confusion and to
acknowledge that there are richer realities and greater powers in the
universe than our meager modern philosophies have dreamed of.",
63
Although he does not say what the "richer realities and greater powers"
might be, it is clear that his solution for law's quandary, like the problem,
is ontological, or metaphysical. The various alternative solutions that I
have canvassed suggest why that is a road that should not be taken.
Whether there is a transcendent reality or power of the kind that
Professor Smith contemplates is a matter about which I have nothing to
say. Even if so, barring a constant, recurring intervention that displaces
human reason altogether, the quandary remains.64 We have no way to
apply general rules to concrete facts, no way to honor the rule of law,
other than as we do, reasoning analogically from case to case. The only
kinds of certainty that we know are unavailing. Finnis's defense of
natural law is a sufficient illustration. Even if one grants that his
fundamental principles are self-evident-a way of avoiding the question,
"How do you know?"-as Finnis concedes, all the issues that trouble us
concretely remain to be determined, perforce, by uncertain, fallible
human reason. Similarly, Dworkin, who sets himself firmly against
ontological solutions, affirms that there is a right answer; but, it turns out,
he means only that we ought to and do apply our capacity to reason,
fallibly, to legal problems. The argument of those who rely on the plain
meaning of the Constitution might be repeated in other contexts where
there is a definite text to consider; but words do not and cannot
guarantee their own meaning and enable us to dispense with, again,
fallible human reason.
I should restate law's quandary this way: How are we to meet the
requirement that the law's demands be defensible not as an expression of
will, or power, but as a reasonable accommodation of the diverse needs
and interests of people living together in a community? In different
ways, both the classical natural law view expressed by Finnis, and the
contemporary reformulation of Dworkin, give an important piece of the
solution. Natural law affirms that the natural order is a moral order, that
63. SMITH, supra note 1, at 179.
64. "[I]t is evident, that whatsoever we believe, upon no other reason, than what is
drawn from authority of men only, and their writings; whether they be sent from God or
not, is faith in men only." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 58 (Michael Oakeshott ed.,
Collier Books 1962) (1651).
65. No case is wholly unlike prior cases. Even in a case of "first impression," such as
a case applying a recently enacted statute for the first time, there are always similarities,
which can be noticed or disregarded. If, up close, the facts seem unique, from further




the normative imperatives of human conduct are not superimposed but
are immanent-"real," if you like that word. So also, Dworkin's
affirmation that there is a right answer insists that searching for the right
answer is not, after all, an empty exercise. Neither proposes seriously to
lead us certainly to the normative reality-the right answer-that it
proclaims. If that is what is required, the quandary is inescapable. But it
should not be required.
For the past two centuries, the shadow of Immanuel Kant has loomed
over us. With rare dissent, it has been and is taken for granted that the
claim of reason is a claim to be guided by principles, which appears to
implicate a requirement that normative reasoning be validated down to
(or up from) the ground. Quite recently, it has been argued generally,
with great force, that such a requirement is a mistake. The moral
dimension of our existence arises, it is urged, not from reason but out of
our experience. 66 As persons, we are aware directly and incontrovertibly
that we are responsible beings and that the choices that we make are
neither random nor, what amounts to the same thing, the product of
67
causes external to ourselves. Furthermore, the moral issues that
confront us and the principles that we bring to bear are deeply
contextual, the context being not a body of abstract principles but the
circumstances-physical, social, historical, intellectual-of our actual
lives. There is a great deal of evidence to support this position, not least
of which is our inability to give a rational account of the human condition
itself-the experience of freedom and responsibility in a causally ordered
universe. If we start from there, our inability to achieve certainty, to find
the one right answer, is not a defeat. It is simply an aspect of the human
condition. There is no quandary, although we shall often be in a
quandary about what is in that instance the right thing to do. In place of
certainty, we may have only a reasonable certitude, based on
conscientious effort to avoid bias, prejudice, indifference, self-interest,
callousness toward others-all the all-too-human sources of error. What
Professor Smith sees as a quandary seems to me rather an opportunity.
66. See MARK JOHNSON, MORAL IMAGINATION (1993). In the specific context of
law, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST (2001).
67. One may want to describe this awareness as self-evident, but that tends to
suggest, incorrectly, that what one is aware of is propositional, which removes the matter
again to the domain of reason.
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